Whether Colorado Statute Permits ICAO to Extend 60 Day Appeal Deadline

Truck operator of a front-loader falls on the steps of the truck injuring himself

Although the claimant’s leg hurt and his elbow was bruised, he told Employer that he did not believe he was seriously injured. The claimant declined medical treatment and signed a medical treatment refusal form. Later that day, Employer reported the claimant’s injury to its insurer, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America (Respondents). The claimant alleged a compensable injury of September 7, 2020. Respondents denied liability and filed as Notice of Contest on January 27, 2021.

Nothing occurred in the claimant’s case for two years. In October 2024, the claimant’s counsel wrote a letter to the Director, pointing out that he had filed a petition to review the case “long ago”. Ultimately, the Division confirmed receipt of the claimant’s petition to review and allowed him twenty days to file a supporting brief. Respondents never challenged the Director’s acceptance of the claimant’s untimely petition. Both parties filed briefs in early 2025.

Additionally, the Panel noted it was unaware of any appellate decision granting it authority to extend the statutory deadline. The claimant appealed this order.

The claimant challenged the Panel’s refusal to act, the sufficiency of the Director’s findings, the meaning of “activity” under the workers’ compensation rules, alleged due process/equal protection violations, Respondents’ alleged misconduct, and whether the record supported the Panel’s action.

The Court of Appeals held it had jurisdiction because, under section 8-43-301(11), the Director’s order became the Panel’s order when the Panel failed to act within 60 days, and the claimant timely sought judicial review. The Court concluded that the Panel correctly determined it lost authority to decide the merits once the 60-day deadline expired; the Director’s order therefore became the Panel’s order by operation of statute.

The Director did not abuse his discretion in closing the claim because the claimant failed to engage in “activity in furtherance of prosecution.” Merely filing applications for hearing was not enough, and the claimant did not attend the required OAC hearing or seek a proper extension.

The Court rejected the claimant’s remaining undeveloped arguments, including unclean hands, inadequate findings, and “rubber stamping.” The Court noted that the claimant’s counsel misquoted cases. For example, the claimant quoted Pinkstaff v. Black and Decker (U.S.) Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 709 (Colo. 2009), for the following proposition: “While the governmental interest regarding Motions to Close pursuant to WCRP 7-1 (C) is to avoid delay, … it should not be used to deny a party his day in Court.” The Court noted that Pinkstaff is not a workers’ compensation case, it does not contain the quoted text, and it does not cite the WCRP. The court warned that future false quotations, including AI-generated ones, may result in sanctions.

Aragorn v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, No. 25CA1303 (Colo. Ct. App. 2026)

Want to know more? Contact Joshua Dillard at jdillard@pollartmiller.com


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