In Zuniga, the claimant began working for the employer in November 2023 as a truck driver. The claimant owned his own tractor-trailer truck which he used to transport loads. The claimant had a trade name and a federal employer’s identification number. The claimant was paid by the load and was responsible for expenses of fuel and maintenance on his truck. However, in February 2024, the claimant’s truck broke down and he did not have sufficient funds to make the necessary repairs. Eventually, the claimant made an arrangement with the employer on February 13, 2024, where the employer loaned a leased truck from GADIS Freight. The expenses for the truck included the lease, fuel, maintenance, and insurance, which were paid by the employer and were recovered by deducting from the amounts owed to the claimant. There was no written lease agreement between the employer and the claimant. From November 2023 to March 14, 2024, the claimant did not drive for other companies, and there was no written agreement between the claimant and the employer.
On March 14, 2024, the claimant was in a motor vehicle accident while operating the leased truck, and he stopped working for the employer afterwards. The claimant filed a claim for temporary medical benefits and medical benefits. The employer contested the claim by arguing that the claimant was an independent contractor, and thus they are not liable for worker’s compensation benefits. Along with the facts outlined above, an employer representative testified that he loaned the truck to the claimant on February 13 so he can complete the delivery of a load which the claimant had previously committed to transporting, and this job was completed after one week of work.
At hearing, the ALJ concluded that the parties intended to have the claimant employed as an independent contractor after February 13, and thus, the claimant was found to not have qualified as an employee under C.R.S. section 8-40-202(2)(a), and his claim was denied.
The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel), however, found that the ALJ erred in applying C.R.S. section 8-40-202(2)(a) to the facts of the claim. C.R.S. section 8-40-301 (5) and (6) provides that any person working as a driver under a lease agreement is excluded from the employee definition, and any person working as such shall be eligible for and offered workers' compensation insurance coverage. The exclusion of the worker from the category of “employee” takes effect only when the lease agreement includes complying coverage. This is to prevent an employer from evading compensation coverage by contracting out work instead of directly hiring the workers.
Here, the parties did not negotiate a lease agreement with complying coverage. Because there is no lease agreement in this case complying with C.R.S. section 40-11.5-102, then C.R.S. section 8-40-202(2)(a) does not apply, and the claimant is considered a covered employee for purposes of worker’s compensation benefits.
Thus, the Panel set aside the ALJ’s order as the claimant was an employee of the respondent as of the March 14, 2024, date of his injury, and the matter is remanded for additional findings and entry of an order on the issues of compensability, temporary disability benefits, and medical benefits.
Zuniga v. YDF Speedy Trucking, W.C. No 5-268-749-001 (I.C.A.O. May 1, 2025).
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